I show through an example that a model that fits the available data perfectly may provide worse answers to policy questions than an alternative, imperfectly fitting, model. I argue that in the context of Bayesian estimation, this result can be interpreted as being due to the use of an inappropriate prior over the parameters of shock processes. I urge the use of priors which are obtained from explicit auxiliary information, not from the desire to obtain identification.
In an influential recent paper, Smets and Wouters (2003) construct a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model with a large number of real and nominal frictions, and estimate the unknown parameters of the model using sophisticated Bayesian techniques.
They document that the estimated model has out-of-sample forecasting performance superior to that of an unrestricted vector autoregression. They write of their findings, "This suggests that the current generation of SDGE [stochastic dynamic general equilibrium] models with sticky prices and wages is sufficiently rich to capture the stochastics and the dynamics in the data, as long as a sufficient number of structural shocks is considered. These models can therefore provide a useful tool for monetary policy analysis ..
.[italics mine]." The European
Central Bank (ECB) agrees. They are planning to begin using models with explicit microfoundations for the first time in their analyses of monetary policy. In doing so, they are explicitly motivated by Smets and Wouters' (2003) analysis. 1 Smets and Wouters and the ECB are adherents to what one might call the principle of fit. According to this principle, models that fit the available data well should be used for policy analysis. Models that do not fit the data well should not be. The principle underlies much of applied economic analysis. It is certainly not special to sophisticated users of econometrics:
even calibrators who use little or no econometrics in their analyses believe in the principle of fit. Indeed, there are literally dozens of calibration papers concerned with figuring out what perturbation in a given model will lead it to fit one or two more extra moments (like the correlation between hours and output or the equity premium).
In this paper, I demonstrate that the principle of fit does not always work. I construct a simple example economy that I treat as if it were the true world. In the context of this economy, I consider an investigator with two potential models to estimate. The investigator's ultimate goal is to use the estimated model to answer a policy question of interest. I show that a model with a perfect fit to the available data may actually provide worse answers than a model with imperfect fit.
The intuition behind this result is quite simple. The policy question of interest concerns the response of labor to a change in the tax rate. The answer to this question depends on the elasticity of labor supply. In both models, the estimate of this parameter hinges on a particular non-testable assumption about how stochastic shocks to the labor supply curve co-vary with tax rates. When this identification restriction is less wrong in the second model than in the first model, the second model provides a better answer to the question of interest, even though its fit is always worse.
In the second part of the paper, I consider a potential fix. I enrich the class of possible models by discarding the non-testable assumption mentioned above. The resultant class of models is by construction only partially identified ; there are a continuum of possible parameter estimates that are consistent with the observed data. I argue that from the Bayesian perspective, the problem in the first part of the paper can be viewed as being due to the use of an incorrect prior over the set of parameters of this richer model. Instead, I suggest using a prior that is carefully motivated from auxiliary information, so that it does not assign zero probability to positive probability events.
In general, there is much prior information available about behavioral parameters, like those governing preferences and technology. However, there is much less prior information about the parameters governing shock processes. One possible response to this problem is to be what I will term agnostic -that is, be fully flexible about the specification of the prior concerning the shock process parameters. I argue in the context of the example that if one takes such an agnostic approach, the data themselves reveal no information about the behavioral parameters. I interpret this result as an indirect argument for the procedure commonly called calibration, in which an investigator picks a plausible range for technology and preference parameters based only on prior auxiliary information.
In the final part of the paper, I return to Smets and Wouters (2003) . Using the above analysis, I offer a critique of their approach to estimation and model evaluation. I suggest how one might change their estimation and evaluation approach to ensure more reliable policy analyses.
The second part of the paper -about Bayesian estimation of models given limited a priori information -is, as far as I know, novel. However, the first part is not new: it is well-known that there are potential problems with the principle of fit. In early contributions, Marschak (1950) and Hurwicz (1950) emphasize that multiple structures (mappings between interventions and outcomes) may be consistent with a given reduced form (probabilistic description of available data). Liu (1960) argues that this potential problem is, in fact, endemic: the available data never serves to identify the true structure uniquely. Perhaps most relatedly, Sims (1980) argues explicitly that large-scale models may fit the data well, and yet provide misleading answers to (some) questions because their estimates are based on incredible identification restrictions.
Despite this lack of novelty, my discussion about the principle of fit serves three purposes. First, the principle remains a dominant one among policymakers and others (as my opening paragraphs indicate). Given the recent excitement about Smets and Wouters (2003) and other related papers, it is worthwhile (I believe) to remind everyone of the principle's limitations.
Second, I want to make absolutely clear that we cannot resolve the problem by using structural models. Most macroeconomists are highly cognizant of the Lucas Critique (1976).
It correctly emphasizes that to assess a policy intervention, a model's parameters should be structural -that is, invariant to the intervention. In response, most macroeconomists now use structural models to analyze policy interventions. My paper demonstrates that this response is not a panacea. In particular, I show that even if it is structural and well-fitting, a model may provide misleading answers to policy questions.
Finally, my argument is not just that fit can lead to worse answers. There is a sense in which we should expect that obtaining better fit will lead to worse answers. Archetypal macroeconomic models are usually under-shocked relative to the data under consideration.
Hence, to get macroeconomic models that fit well, we need to add shocks. But we generally know little about these shocks. It should not be at all surprising if adding them were to create new, possibly substantial, sources of error.
An Artificial World and Policy Interventions
As described in the introduction, the basic structure of this paper is akin to a Monte Carlo study. I first set up an artificial world over which I have complete control. I introduce an investigator (econometrician) into this artificial world. The investigator does not know the structure of the artificial world, but is instead limited to using one of two possible (classes of) models. Both are false, in the sense that the artificial world is not a special case of either model; however, the investigator does not know that they are false. Based on data from the artificial world, the investigator uses a variety of possible methods to determine which model has superior fit.
In this section, I describe the artificial world and a class of policy interventions under consideration in that world. In the artificial world, agents decide how much to work at each date. Their decisions are influenced by shocks to labor productivity, taxes, and preferences.
The means of these random variables are hit by observable shocks in each period. Preference shocks and tax rates co-vary; it is this covariance that makes estimation of the parameters of the model challenging.
A. The Artificial World
Time is discrete, and continues forever. There is a unit measure of agents who live forever. Their preferences are given by:
where c t is consumption in period t and n t is labor in period t. Technology is given by:
where y t is the amount of consumption produced in period t.
Agents are taxed at rate τ t , where τ t is governed by the policy rule:
The proceeds of the taxes are handed back lump-sum to the agents.
The random variables (A t , ψ t , ε t ) are i.i.d. over time. There is another random variable λ t , which is equally likely to be 0 or 1. Conditional on λ t = i, the random variables (A, ψ, ε)
are all Gaussian and mutually independent, with means (μ
Note that the means depend on i, but the variances do not.
It is easy to prove that in this economy, there is a unique equilibrium of the form:
B. Interventions
Consider the following class of interventions, indexed by the real variable ∆. With intervention ∆, the tax rate follows the rule:
The question of interest is how much does average logged output change in response to a change in the tax rate. Mathematically, let y t (∆) denote per-capita output under intervention ∆. What is E(ln(y t (∆ * ))) − E(ln(y t )), where ∆ * is a given intervention? The true answer to this question is ∆ * /γ * .
Two (Identified) Models
There is an investigator who wants to know the answer to the question of interest.
The investigator does not know the structure of the artificial world, but does observe the following data:
The investigator has two possible models to use to answer the question. The basic economic elements of the models are the same as that of the artificial world itself. In each model, there is a unit measure of identical agents who work to produce output. The agents face a linear tax on output, and the proceeds of this tax are handed out lump-sum. However, the shock generation processes in the two models are different from each other, and from the artificial world.
A. Model 1
In the first model, preferences are of the form:
Technology is given by:
Agents are taxed at rate τ t , where:
The random variables (A 1t , ψ 1t , ε 1t ) are i.i.d. over time and mutually independent. The random variable λ t has support {0, 1}; the probability that λ t equals 1 is given by p 1 . Conditional
and variances (σ
). The investigator does not know these means and variances; they will have to be estimated in some fashion from the data. Put another way, this is actually a class of models indexed by the eleven parameters
Model 1 implies that in equilibrium:
How does Model 1 differ from the artificial world? It is alike in all respects except one:
in model 1, the parameter β has been set to zero. As we shall see, this additional restriction allows the investigator to estimate γ 1 from the available data.
B. Model 2
In the second model, preferences are given by:
and technology is given by:
Here, ψ 2 , A 2 (1) and A 2 (0) are all constants; λ t is a random variable.
The random variable λ t is i.i.d over time, with support {0, 1}, and the probability that λ t equals 1 is given by p 2 . The parameters ε 2 (1) and ε 2 (0) are both constants. Hence, in model 2,
The model implies that:
How does Model 2 differ from the artificial world? In Model 2, tastes do not vary at all. As well, the variances of the other shocks around their means are both set to zero.
Like many modern macroeconomic models, Model 2 has relatively few sources of uncertainty compared to what is true of the (artificial) world.
The Fallacy of Fit
The investigator has two models available. He wants to use his infinitely long sample to decide which model to use in order to answer the question of interest. The sample
∞ t=1 is jointly Gaussian conditional on λ t = i, for i = 0, 1. The means of the conditional distributions depend on λ t ; the conditional distributions have the same variance-covariance matrix. Hence, the sample can be fully summarized by thirteen moments: the probability p that λ t equals 1, the means (μ
conditional on λ t = i, and the variance-covariance matrix Σ of (ln(y), ln(n), ln(1 − τ )) (conditional on λ).
Note that in these data, there are two distinct kinds of variation. The first kind is due to λ. Movements in λ generate changes in (μ y (i), μ n (i), μ τ (i)); these changes can provide information about the unknown parameters of the two models. At the same time,
(ln(y), ln(n), ln(1 − τ )) vary around these fluctuating means. This information is summarized by the six moments of Σ. The goal of the investigator is to use these two sources of variation to estimate the unknown parameter γ.
Given this information, the investigator has three model estimation/evaluation methods available.
A. Method 1: Maximum Likelihood
In this subsection, I suppose that the investigator estimates the unknown parameters of each model by maximum likelihood, and then compares the models' abilities to fit the thirteen population moments.
Model 2 implies that, conditional on λ t = i, the data is deterministic. In other words, according to model 2, the conditional variance-covariance matrix of (ln(y t ), ln(n t ), ln(1 − τ t ))
contains only zeros. It follows that the likelihood of the data, conditional on any specification of model 2, is 0.
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For model 1, the maximum likelihood estimates of the eleven unknown parameters are
given by:
Given the infinitely long sample, these estimates are very precise; the likelihood of the sample is 1 given this parameter setting, and 0 given all others. Note that under this parameter setting, the model fits all thirteen moments of the data exactly.
Hence, according to maximum likelihood, only Model 1 should be used to answer the question (with the parameter estimates (1)). No specification of Model 2 should be used. The lack of fit is due to the fact that Model 2 is "under-shocked" relative to the data. The world has four distinct shocks generating the data. Model 2 has only one. Maximum likelihood punishes this kind of discrepancy severely; from a statistical point of view, it is the most readily detectable form of mis-specification.
B. Method 2: Bayesian Estimation
In this subsection, I suppose that the investigator applies Bayesian estimation methods to the available data from the artificial world. Obviously, models 1 and 2 are nested -if model 2 is true, model 1 is also true. Consider an econometrician who has a prior over the 11 unknown parameters of Model 1. The prior is such that it puts probability q on the parameters being consistent with Model 2 and puts probability (1 − q) on the parameters being inconsistent with Model 2. Now suppose the econometrician observes an infinite sequence of data from the artificial world. The data bleaches out the effect of the initial prior; the econometrician's posterior will be concentrated on the parameter estimates (1). A Bayesian econometrician with an infinitely long sample will reach the same policy conclusions as does a classical econometrician using maximum likelihood.
C. Method 3: Method of Moments
As we have seen, maximum likelihood and Bayesian estimation simply discard all under-shocked models. Now, we consider a less severe measure of fit: method of moments. generates a non-invertible variance-covariance matrix for any parameter setting, the objective must be strictly larger than 0. Model 1 must fit the data better than model 2, according to this measure of fit.
However, using method of moments, we can now actually estimate parameters for model 2, as opposed to simply discarding it as maximum likelihood does. For model 2, regardless of the weights, the estimated seven parameters are:
The seven parameters are set so that the model generates the values in the data for the moments (p, μ y (1), μ y (0), μ τ (1), μ τ (0), μ n (1), μ n (0)). Model 2 predicts that the other moments are zero for any choice of parameters, so that part of the minimization problem is irrelevant for parameter estimation.
D. Using the Estimated Models to Answer the Question of Interest
Recall that the question of interest is:
when taxes are changed so that ln(1 − τ t (∆ * )) − ln(1 − τ t ) = ∆ * . The true answer to this question is given by ∆ * /γ * .
What is the answer to this question delivered by the two models? Under model 1, the answer is ∆ * /b γ 1 = ∆ * Σ nτ /Σ ττ , where Σ nτ is the population covariance of ln(n t ) and ln(1−τ t )
in the artificial world and Σ ττ is the population variance of ln(1 − τ t ) in the true world. (This is ∆ * multiplied by the population regression coefficient.) We can calculate these population moments to find that that answer in model 1 is given by:
which is too large in absolute value relative to the true answer of ∆ * /γ * .
Under model 2, the answer to the question is given by:
Note that for (μ ψ (1) − μ ψ (0)) sufficiently close to zero in absolute value, ANS 2 is nearer to 1/γ * than is ANS 1 . Even though Model 2 fits worse than Model 1, it may still deliver superior answers to the question of interest.
E. Why Doesn't Fit Work?
In the above discussion, we have seen that the model that fits better -indeed, the model that fits the available data perfectly -may well deliver a worse answer to the question of interest. What is going on here? I posed the following question of interest: what happens to hours worked if we increase the tax rate on labor? The answer is wholly governed by the elasticity of labor, which is equal to 1/γ * in the artificial world. To answer the question of interest, the investigator has to estimate γ * well. The difficulty in doing so is a traditional one. If there are no shifts in labor supply, then the co-movement in hours and tax rates will pin down the elasticity of labor supply. However, if labor supply shifts (that is, movements in ψ) are correlated with the variation in tax rates, then the investigator will achieve biased estimates of 1/γ * .
How do the two models estimate γ * ? In the artificial world described above, there are two sorts of variation in the data. The first is that the means of the distributions of (A, ψ, ln(1 − τ )) fluctuate over time. The second is that the realizations of the random variables fluctuate around their means. The good news is that, because λ is observable, the two kinds of variations are distinct. The bad news is that both kinds of fluctuations feature potential co-movement between ψ t and τ t -co-movement that makes our task of estimating γ more difficult.
The two models differ in their estimates of γ because each one relies on a different type of fluctuation to pin down γ. Model 1 assumes (incorrectly) that the fluctuations of ln(1 − τ t ) and ψ t around their means are independent. It then exploits the fluctuations in tax rates and hours around their means to estimate γ. Model 2 assumes (incorrectly) that the mean of ψ t does not fluctuate at all. It then uses the shifts in the means of hours and tax rates over time to estimate γ. Which one works better depends on which incorrect assumption is a better approximation to reality. Nothing in the data answers this question.
The key point is that the relative fit of the models does not tell us which of these assumptions is closer to being right. More generally, parameter estimation of any kind always relies on two sources of information: the data and non-testable identification assumptions.
The fit of a model tells us nothing about the reliability of the latter. 3 Yet their reliability is essential if one is to obtain accurate parameter estimates.
Prior Care
The problem with Model 1 is that it includes a false restriction. That restriction is included solely to identify the unknown parameter. In this section, I consider a richer model than Model 1, in which I dispense with the false identification restriction. By construction, this model is only partially identified. I argue that one way to interpret the problem with Model 1 is that the investigator is using an incorrect prior over the larger parameter space of this richer model. I suggest a simple fix to these problems: estimate the larger, partially identified, model in a Bayesian fashion while being meticulous in building the prior explicitly from auxiliary information.
As before, assume that there is an investigator who has an infinite sample (ln(y t ), ln(n t ), ln(1− τ t ), λ t ) ∞ t=1 from the artificial world described in Section 1. The investigator does not use model 1 or model 2 though. Instead, the investigator uses a new model 3.
Model 3
In the third model, preferences are of the form:
The random variables (A 3t , ψ 3t , ε 3t ) are i.i.d. over time and mutually independent. The collection of random variables {λ t } ∞ t=1 are i.i.d., with support {0, 1}; the probability that λ t equals 1 is given by p 3 . Conditional on λ t = i, the random variables (A 3t , ψ 3t , ε 3t ) are Gaussian, with means (μ 3A (i), μ 3ψ (i), μ 3ε (i)) 
Model 3 implies that in equilibrium:
Model 3 is exactly the same as model 1, except that in Model 3, tax rates may be correlated with the preference shock ψ 3 . This change means that Model 3 is sufficiently rich so as to nest both Model 1 and the artificial world itself.
Model 3 is only partially identified. Suppose γ 3 = b γ 3 . Then, there is a unique specification of the other 11 parameters so that model 3 fits the available data exactly. In particular, let:
and then the thirteen moments generated by model 3 correspond to the moments of the sample. (Note that all parameter estimates that are supposed to be non-negative (that is, variances) are in fact non-negative.) Hence, for each specification of the parameter b γ 3 , there exists a specification of the other 11 parameters so that the model exactly fits the data.
Recently, there has been a great deal of work on classical methods to estimate partially identified models (see Manski (2006) for a useful survey). However, I believe that it is most useful to consider the estimation of Model 3 from a Bayesian perspective. 4 Specifically, let
, p 3 ) represent the parameters of the model other than γ 3 . Suppose that the parameter space for (γ 3 , θ 3 ) is given by R + × Θ, where
This parameter space is a 12-dimensional manifold. I assume that the investigator has a prior density over this manifold such that γ 3 is stochastically independent from θ. I will let the marginal prior density over γ 3 be denoted by f and the prior density over θ be denoted by g.
A basic intuition in Bayesian estimation/learning is that the prior is essentially irrelevant if one has a large amount of the data. Intuitively, the impact of the data is sufficiently large to bleach out the initial information in the prior. However, this intuition applies only when the model is identified. As we shall see, when one uses the partially identified model 3, the prior over (γ 3 , θ) affects the posterior distribution over γ 3 , even though the investigator has access to an infinite sample.
A. A Mistaken Prior: The Case of Model 1
Suppose g is such that the prior puts probability one on the event β 3 = 0. In this case, after seeing the available data, the investigator's posterior is concentrated on the vector (1).
With this kind of prior, model 3 is equivalent to model 1.
We have seen that using Model 1 gives misleading answers to the question of interest.
A prior like g implicitly contains a great deal of information, because no amount of data can shift the investigator from his belief that β 3 = 0.It should not be used unless the investigator actually has this information about the world.
B. An Arbitrary Prior
Suppose instead that g and f are such that the support of the investigator's prior is the entire parameter space. Let h(b γ 3 ; Data) represent the parameter estimates (2) when
Then, after seeing the infinite sample, the investigator's posterior is concentrated
His posterior over this one-dimensional manifold is proportional to φ(b γ 3 ), where:
(Here, h n represents the nth component of the function h.) Given this posterior uncertainty, the investigator's answer to the question of interest is no longer a single number. Instead, the investigator's answer to the question of interest is now a random variable, with support
and density proportional to:
where x represents the answer to the question of interest.
Because the model is only partially identified, the investigator's posterior over the answer to the question of interest is influenced by his marginal prior f over the preference parameter γ 3 and his prior g over the other parameters. This dependence exists even though he sees an infinite sample. 5 This means that the investigator cannot count on the available data eventually correcting all misinformation in his initial prior. Instead, he must be sure that his prior truly represents information about these parameters derived from auxiliary sources. 5 Note that in (2) , the estimates (b σ
only depend on the data, and not on b γ 3 . Hence, the posterior over these four parameters is concentrated on a single vector after the investigator sees an infinite sample.
C. No Prior Information About Shock Processes
It is easy to see how to construct a prior f over the preference parameters (or over technology parameters in a more general context). We can derive information about such behavioral parameters from other data sources, from introspection, or from experiments.
However, it is more difficult to obtain this information about the joint shock process (A, τ , ψ) .
In at least some, and perhaps most, cases, there will be no auxiliary information available about these processes. What should be done? 6 In this subsection, I assume that the investigator has information that leads to a prior
The investigator has no auxiliary information about the shock processes.
The Bayesian Approach
One possible response to this no-information situation is to formulate a purely subjective prior belief over the eleven parameters of the shock process and then proceed in a standard Bayesian fashion. In doing so, it is important to keep two issues in mind. First, as we have seen above, when the model is partially identified, the prior impacts the answer to the question of interest regardless of how large the sample is. The subjective beliefs always matter.
Second, every prior -regardless of how neutral it may seem -has some information embedded in it. To appreciate this last point, suppose there is a parameter α. All that an investigator truly knows about α is that α lies in [0, 1]; he wants his prior over α to be neutral over its location within that interval. It is tempting to conclude that we can capture this neutrality by using a uniform distribution over 
An Agnostic Approach
The Bayesian approach weds the investigator to a single prior g. As I suggest above, this prior contains information -information that the investigator does not literally have.
One response to this problem is to use what I would call an agnostic approach: be flexible about the choice of g, and compute a posterior density for each possible prior g over γ 3 . By doing so, the investigator's answer to the question of interest is no longer a single number, or even a single posterior, but rather a collection of posteriors generated by varying g. All of
The resulting collection of posteriors is large. In particular, let p be any continuous
Let g p be a continuous function mapping Θ into R + such that: It is important to emphasize that this conclusion does not mean that the data is useless under the agnostic approach. Estimation collapses the support of the original joint prior from a twelve-dimensional manifold to the one-dimensional support of the posterior. Hence, the prior information about γ 3 , combined with the data, does help the investigator learn about a great deal about the nature of the shocks hitting the economy. It is true that this information is irrelevant given the question of interest that I posed above. For other potential questions, though, this information may well be valuable.
The Agnostic Approach and Decision-Making
Of course, more generally, the investigator may have some information about the underlying shocks that restricts the possible specifications of g. Then, the agnostic approach does not collapse to calibration. In this general case, the agnostic approach implies that each policy intervention (each ∆) leads to a set of posterior probability distributions over outcomes.
It is interesting to consider the problem of choosing ∆ in this setting. Suppose there is a social welfare W (p) associated with a given posterior p over the set of outcomes. Let Π(∆) represent the set of possible posteriors implied by a given ∆. Then, choosing ∆ is akin to optimizing under Knightian uncertainty, as opposed to risk. It is standard in such settings to use a maximin approach, under which the choice of ∆ solves the problem:
Hurwicz (1950, p. 257) provides a similar resolution to the problem of decision-making with partially identified models. Their motivation for their choice of prior over the ten shock processes is quite different.
They write, "Identification is achieved by assuming that each of the structural shocks are uncorrelated and that four of the ten shocks ... follow a white noise process." In other 7 See Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989) for an axiomatization of this approach to uncertainty. words, they choose the prior over the ten shock processes in order to achieve identification, not because of auxiliary information. The first example makes clear the problems with this approach. Like Smets and Wouters, the user of Model 1 chooses the prior over the shock processes so as to achieve identification. Because this prior does not truly reflect auxiliary information, the resulting estimates are severely biased, even though the model fits the data exactly. Smets and Wouters give us no reason to believe why the same should not be true of the estimates of their model. 8 The second part of the current paper suggests an alternative approach. The investigator should not pick a prior that is designed to achieve identification. Instead, the prior -or collection of priors -over the shock processes should reflect the investigator's actual beliefs about those processes. The resulting set of posteriors will naturally contain less information -but also be more reliable. The key property of Model 3 is that it is sufficiently rich to include as a special case the artificial world that is actually generating the data. It is certainly difficult to build such a class of models in the real world. Nonetheless, Bayesian estimation techniques (or any other for that matter) are only reliable if one does so. 9 
Conclusions
A model-based analysis of a policy intervention has two steps. The first is to figure out the key parameters that shape the quantitative impact of the intervention. The second is to gather information about these parameters. This information can come in two forms: 8 In their recent discussion of identification of DSGE models, Canova and Sala (2006) write that, "... resisting the temptation to arbitrarily induce identifiability is the only way to make DSGE models verifiable and knowledge about them accumulate on solid ground." I agree. 9 See Schorfheide (2000) for a discussion of how to augment Bayesian techniques to allow for the possibility that no model under consideration is true. prior information and information derived from estimating the model using a particular data set. The first part of this paper argues that the fit of a model tells us little about the quality of information coming from either source. The second part of the paper argues that the latter source of information (estimation) is not useful unless the investigator has reliable prior information about shock processes.
There is an important lesson for the analysis of monetary policy. Simply adding shocks to models in order to make them fit the data better should not improve our confidence in those models' predictions for the impact of policy changes. Instead, we need to find ways to improve our information about the models' key parameters (for example, the costs and the frequency of price adjustment). It is possible that this improved information may come from estimation of model parameters using macroeconomic data. However, as we have seen, this kind of estimation is only useful if we have reliable a priori evidence about the shock processes.
My own belief is that this kind of a priori evidence is unlikely to be available. Then, auxiliary data sources -like the microeconometric evidence set forth by Bils and Klenow (2004) -will serve as our best source of reliable information about the key parameters in monetary models.
